EC933-G-AU – Lecture 5 16 November 2005

Asset Markets and Risk Sharing: Analytical Introduction of Uncertainty

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Plan of talk

introduction

- 1. 2-period 2-state **SOE** real model: exogenous prices
- 2. Arrow-Debreu paradigm and complete asset markets
- 3. actuarially fair prices and consumption smoothing
- 4. Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion
- 5. 2-period *S-state* **2-country** real model: *endo*genous prices
- 6. models with **financial market imperfections**
- wrap-up

Aim and learning outcomes

- aim: continue building up the microfoundations of open-economy macromodels by focusing on the *analytics* of **uncertainty** (or risk)
- learning outcomes
 - define and discuss
 - Arrow-Debreu contingent claim securities
 - actuarially fair prices and consumption smoothing across states
 - derive and interpret in *partial* and/or *general* equilibrium
 - standard inter-state Euler equations
 - coefficient of relative risk aversion
 - equilibrium prices and real interest rate
 - equilibrium consumption levels
 - analyse the basic set-up of microfounded stochastic OEMs

2-period 2-state SOE real model: assumptions

- assumptions **kept** from the nonstochastic 2-period SOE real model
 - 1. 2 countries, \overline{SOE} (H) and \overline{RoW} (F)
 - 2. that last for 2 periods
 - 3. a single, perishable /nonstorable/ and tradable good available to consume
 - 4. no production (function), i.e. an *endowment* model
 - 5. no investment
 - 6. no government spending
 - 7. no money, i.e. *real* model
 - 8. SOE takes RIR and asset prices as given, i.e. all prices are exogenous
 - 9. the *representative* individual
 - has *known* (thus, certain) income on date 1
 - starts out with zero net foreign assets
 - 10. a *constant* population size normalised at 1: *per capita* = *aggregate* quantities
- additional assumptions
 - 1. 2 states of nature *possible* on date 2, with *uncertain* actual realisation
 - occur *randomly*, according to a specified (i.e. *known*) probability distribution
 - differ *only* in their associated endowment (or output, or income) levels on date 2
 - 2. economic agents have sufficient foresight to *prearrange*, by explicit or implicit contracts, for trades in assets that protect them (partially) against contingencies

2-period 2-state SOE real model: utility

lifetime expected utility

would be simply $u(c_2)$ under certainty (cf. lecture 4)

$$U_l = u(c_1) + \beta \{\pi(1)u[c_2(1)] + \pi(2)u[c_2(2)]\}$$

 $\equiv \beta E_1[u(c_2)]$, i.e. expected (ex ante) utility of consumption on date 2

where

$$\beta \equiv \frac{1}{1+\delta} \qquad \qquad \pi(1) + \pi(2) = 1$$

 comprised of time- and state-invariant, increasing and concave period utility

2-period 2-state SOE real model: constraints

net accumulation of assets

would be simply b_2 (with $b_1 \equiv 0$) under certainty (cf. lecture 4)

$$\frac{p(1)}{1+r}b_2(1) + \frac{p(2)}{1+r}b_2(2) \equiv y_1 - c_1$$

PV of insurance *if state* 1 on date 2

PV of insurance *if state* 2 on date 2

date 1 net saving

PV of *total* insurance for the uncertainty of date 2

lifetime budget constraint

would be c_2 under certainty (cf. lecture 4)

$$c_1 + \frac{p(1)c_2(1)+p(2)c_2(2)}{1+r}$$

would be y_2 under certainty (cf. lecture 4)

$$=y_1 + \frac{\overbrace{p(1)y_2(1)+p(2)y_2(2)}}{1+r}$$

PV of lifetime (state-)contingent consumption

PV of lifetime (state-)contingent income

2-period 2-state SOE real model: consumer's problem and its FONCs

• objective function, as unconstrained optimisation problem

$$\max_{b_2(s)} U_l = u \left[y_1 - \sum_{s=1}^2 \frac{p(s)}{1+r} b_2(s) \right] + \sum_{s=1}^2 \pi(s) \beta u [y_2(s) + b_2(s)]$$

• FONCs, as inter-state Euler equations

$$\frac{\partial U_l}{\partial b_2(s)} = 0 \qquad s = 1, 2 \Leftrightarrow \frac{p(s)}{1+r} u'(c_1) = \pi(s) \beta u'[c_2(s)], \qquad s = 1, 2$$

• FONCs, as MRS equal to relative price

$$\frac{\pi(s)\beta u'[c_2(s)]}{u'(c_1)} = \frac{p(s)}{1+r}, \qquad s = 1, 2$$

2-period 2-state SOE real model: actuarially fair prices and consumption smoothing

• creating synthetic assets form primal A-D securities => p(1) + p(2) = 1

$$\underbrace{(1+r)}_{1+r} \qquad + \qquad \underbrace{(1+r)}_{1+r} \qquad = \qquad \underbrace{\frac{p(2)}{1+r}}_{1} \qquad = \qquad \underbrace{1}_{r}$$

units of state 1 A-D_{unit price} of state 1 A-D unit price of state 2 A-D_{unit price} of state 2 A-D cost in terms of date 1 output units to buy 1 bond

• adding FONCs => stochastic Euler eq for a riskless bond

$$\underbrace{[p(1) + p(2)]}_{=1} u'(c_1) = (1+r)\beta \underbrace{\{\pi(1)u'[c_2(1)] + \pi(2)u'[c_2(2)]\}}_{\equiv E_1[u'(c_2)], \text{ by definition}$$

• compact FONC => actuarially fair prices of A-D securities

$$\frac{\pi(1)u'[c_2(1)]}{\pi(2)u'[c_2(2)]} = \frac{p(1)}{p(2)}$$

$$\frac{\pi(1)}{\pi(2)} = \frac{p(1)}{\pi(2)}$$

$$u'[c_2(1)] = u'[c_2(2)], \text{ hence } c_2(1) = c_2(2) = c_2 = const$$

• special case: consumption smoothing optimal only if A-D prices actuarially fair

2-period 2-state SOE real model: Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion

start from across-state Euler

equation and take natural logs
$$\ln \left[\frac{\pi(1)u'[c_2(1)]}{\pi(2)u'[c_2(2)]} \right] = \ln \left[\frac{p(1)}{p(2)} \right]$$

=const

$$\ln p(1) - \ln p(2) = \ln u'[c_2(1)] - \ln u'[c_2(2)] + \ln \pi(1) - \ln \pi(2)$$

totally differentiate result

$$\frac{d \ln p(1)}{d p(1)} d p(1) - \frac{d \ln p(2)}{d p(2)} d p(2) = \frac{d \ln u'[c_2(1)]}{d c_2(1)} d c_2(1) - \frac{d \ln u'[c_2(2)]}{d c_2(2)} d c_2(2)$$

$$\frac{dp(1)}{p(1)} - \frac{dp(2)}{p(2)} = \frac{1}{u'[c_2(1)]} u''[c_2(1)] \underbrace{\frac{c_2(1)}{c_2(1)}}_{l} dc_2(1) - \underbrace{\frac{1}{u'[c_2(2)]}}_{l} u''[c_2(2)] \underbrace{\frac{c_2(2)}{c_2(2)}}_{l} dc_2(2)$$

$$d\ln\left[\frac{p(1)}{p(2)}\right] = \frac{c_2(1)u''[c_2(1)]}{u'[c_2(1)]}d\ln c_2(1) - \frac{c_2(2)u''[c_2(2)]}{u'[c_2(2)]}d\ln c_2(2)$$

=const

2-period 2-state SOE real model: Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion (II)

• define the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion as

$$\rho(c) \equiv -\frac{cu''(c)}{u'(c)}$$

- assume it to be constant: C(onstant)RRA $\Leftrightarrow \rho(c) = \rho = const$
- then, the last equation on previous slide simplifies to

$$d \ln \left[\frac{p(1)}{p(2)} \right] = \frac{c_2(1)u''[c_2(1)]}{u'[c_2(1)]} d \ln c_2(1) - \frac{c_2(2)u''[c_2(2)]}{u'[c_2(2)]} d \ln c_2(2)$$

$$= -\rho$$

$$= \rho$$

$$d \ln \left[\frac{p(1)}{p(2)} \right] = \rho d \ln \left[\frac{c_2(2)}{c_2(1)} \right] d \ln \left[\frac{c_2(2)}{c_2(1)} \right] = \frac{1}{\rho} d \ln \left[\frac{p(1)}{p(2)} \right]$$

- the **inverse** of CRRA, $1/\rho$, is, by definition, the **elasticity of substitution** b/n *state-contingent* consumption levels with respect to relative A-D prices
- high $\rho \Leftrightarrow 0 < 1/\rho < 1 \Leftrightarrow$ inelastic response of relative consumption to change in relative price of insurance

2-period 2-state SOE real model: pros and cons of CRRA utility and log utility

• RRA constant if special CRRA (cf. isoelastic) period utility (class of functions)

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}, \quad \rho > 0, \rho \neq 1$$

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}, \quad \sigma > 0$$

• for log utility, Euler equations reduce to

$$\frac{p(1)}{1+r} \underbrace{\frac{1}{c_1}}_{1+r} = \pi(1)\beta \underbrace{\frac{1}{c_2(1)}}_{u'[c_2(1)]}$$

$$\frac{p(2)}{1+r} \underbrace{\frac{1}{c_1}}_{1+r} = \pi(2)\beta \underbrace{\frac{1}{c_2(2)}}_{u'[c_2(2)]}$$

optimal consumption demands with log utility are shown in lecture to be

$$c_1 = \frac{1}{1+\beta} \mathcal{W}_l = \frac{1}{1+\beta} \left[y_1 + \frac{p(1)y_2(1) + p(2)y_2(2)}{1+r} \right]$$

$$\frac{p(1)}{1+r}c_2(1) = \frac{\pi(1)\beta}{1+\beta}\mathcal{W}_l = \frac{\pi(1)\beta}{1+\beta} \left[y_1 + \frac{p(1)y_2(1)+p(2)y_2(2)}{1+r} \right]$$

$$\frac{p(2)}{1+r}c_2(2) = \frac{\pi(2)\beta}{1+\beta}\mathcal{W}_l = \frac{\pi(2)\beta}{1+\beta} \left[y_1 + \frac{p(1)y_2(1)+p(2)y_2(2)}{1+r} \right]$$

2-period 2-state SOE real model: consumption demands and CA under log utility

• expression **parallel** to the nonstochastic *log*-utility case

$$CA_1 = y_1 - c_1 = y_1 - \frac{1}{1+\beta} \left[y_1 + \frac{p(1)y_2(1) + p(2)y_2(2)}{1+r} \right] =$$

$$= \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} y_1 - \frac{1}{1+\beta} \left[\frac{p(1)y_2(1)}{1+r} + \frac{p(2)y_2(2)}{1+r} \right]$$

- but **cannot** be directly interpreted by analogy with comparative advantage, as we did for intertemporal trade
- because now three, not two, "goods"
 - 1. certain consumption on date 1
 - 2. contingent consumption on date 2 state 1
 - 3. contingent consumption on date 2 state 2

2-period S-state 2-country global real model: general equilibrium under CRRA utility

assumptions

- now 2 large economies, H and F (instead of SOE-RoW)
- CRRA utility, for simplicity and to gain some initial intuition
- more than 2 states of nature

market-clearing (GE) conditions

$$c_1 + c_1^* = y_1 + y_1^*$$
 $c_2(s) + c_2^*(s) = y_2(s) + y_2^*(s), \quad s = 1, 2, ..., S \quad y^W \equiv y + y^*$

$$s = 1, 2, \dots, S \qquad y^W \equiv y + y^*$$

Euler equations under CRRA utility

$$\frac{p(s)}{1+r} \underbrace{[c_1]^{-\rho}}_{1+r} = \pi(s)\beta \underbrace{[c_2(s)]^{-\rho}}_{u'[c_2(1)]}, \qquad s = 1, 2, \dots, S \qquad \frac{p(s)}{1+r} \underbrace{[c_1^*]^{-\rho}}_{1+r} = \pi(s)\beta \underbrace{[c_2^*(s)]^{-\rho}}_{u'[c_2(1)]}$$

$$s=1,2,\ldots,S$$

$$\frac{p(s)}{1+r} \left[c_1^* \right]^{-\rho} = \pi(s) \beta \left[c_2^*(s) \right]^{-\rho}$$

$$u'(c_1) \qquad u'[c_2(1)]$$

$$c_2(s) = \left[\frac{\pi(s)\beta(1+r)}{p(s)}\right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}c_1, \qquad s = 1, 2, \dots, S, \qquad c_2^*(s) = \left[\frac{\pi(s)\beta(1+r)}{p(s)}\right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}c_1^*$$

$$s=1,2,\ldots,\mathcal{S},$$

$$c_2^*(s) = \left[\frac{\pi(s)\beta(1+r)}{p(s)}\right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}c_1^*$$

2-period *S*-state 2-country global real model: date 1 A-D prices in GE under CRRA utility

• equilibrium date 1 prices: summing up consumption

$$\underbrace{c_{2}(s) + c_{2}^{*}(s)}_{=y_{2}^{W}(s)} = \left[\frac{\pi(s)\beta(1+r)}{p(s)}\right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \underbrace{(c_{1} + c_{1}^{*})}_{=y_{1}^{W}}, \qquad s = 1, 2, \dots, \mathcal{S}$$

$$\equiv y_{1}^{W}$$

$$\frac{p(s)}{1+r} = \pi(s)\beta \left[\frac{y_2^W(s)}{y_1^W}\right]^{-\rho}, \qquad s = 1, 2, \dots, S$$

• dividing through => actuarially fair prices **iff** world output invariant across states $\frac{p(s)}{p(s')} = \left[\frac{y_2^W(s)}{y_2^W(s')}\right]^{-\rho} \frac{\pi(s)}{\pi(s')}$

2-period *S*-state 2-country global real model: date 2 A-D prices and RIR in GE under CRRA utility

• equilibrium date 2 prices: for any state s', arbitrage condition

$$\sum_{s=1}^{\mathcal{S}} p(s) = 1$$

and last expression on previous slide imply

$$p(s') = 1 - \sum_{s \neq s'} p(s) = 1 - p(s') \sum_{s \neq s'} \left[\frac{y_2^W(s)}{y_2^W(s')} \right]^{-\rho} \frac{\pi(s)}{\pi(s')}$$

• an equation which can be solved for p(s')

$$p(s') = \frac{\pi(s')[y_2^W(s')]^{-\rho}}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(s)[y_2^W(s)]^{-\rho}}$$

• equilibrium **RIR**: above eq and date 1 *price* eqs =>

$$\beta \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(s) \left[y_2^W(s) \right]^{-\rho}$$

2-period *S*-state 2-country global real model: GE consumption levels under CRRA utility

multi-state analogues of two-state Euler equations

$$\frac{\pi(s)\beta u'[c_2(s)]}{u'[c_1]} = \frac{p(s)}{1+r} = \frac{\pi(s)\beta u'[c_2^*(s)]}{u'[c_1^*]} \qquad \frac{\pi(s)u'[c_2(s)]}{\pi(s')u'[c_2(s')]} = \frac{p(s)}{p(s')} = \frac{\pi(s)u'[c_2^*(s)]}{\pi(s')u'[c_2^*(s')]}$$

combined with last equation two slides ago and CRRA utility

$$\frac{c_2(s)}{c_2(s')} = \frac{c_2^*(s)}{c_2^*(s')} = \frac{y_2^W(s)}{y_2^W(s')} \qquad \frac{c_2(s)}{c_1} = \frac{c_2^*(s)}{c_1^*} = \frac{y_2^W(s)}{y_1^W}$$

• constant fractions of world date 2 output and its growth rate

$$\frac{c_2(s)}{y_2^W(s)} = \frac{c_2(s')}{y_2^W(s')}, \qquad \frac{c_2^*(s)}{y_2^W(s)} = \frac{c_2^*(s')}{y_2^W(s')} \qquad \frac{c_2(s)}{y_2^W(s)} = \phi = \frac{c_1}{y_1^W}, \qquad \frac{c_2^*(s)}{y_2^W(s)} = 1 - \phi = \frac{c_1^*}{y_1^W}$$

• graphical interpretation: O-R(96), Fig. 5.1, p. 290

Models with capital market imperfections

- up to here: *idealised* situation of **complete** asset markets => international *risk sharing*
- modelling various types of *realistic* **imperfections** of world *financial* markets
 - difficulty in *enforcing* financial contracts outside national jurisdiction: sovereign risk => O-R(96), section 6.1
 - problem of asymmetric information
 - **hidden** *information* and risk sharing: adverse selection => O-R(96), section 6.3
 - hidden *actions*: **moral hazard** in international lending => O-R(96), section 6.4

Concluding wrap-up

What have we learnt?

- define and analyse the implications of
 - Arrow-Debreu securities and complete asset markets
 - actuarially fair contingent claim prices and consumption smoothing
- derive and interpret
 - standard *inter-state* Euler equations
 - Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion
 - risk sharing in theory and in practice
- summarise the baseline set-up of microfounded stochastic
 OEMs
- Where we go next: to *applications/extensions* of the analytical framework introduced in a series of important models/papers