INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE WITH GOAL DEPENDENCE: LESSONS FROM THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S REACTION FUNCTION

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ABSTRACT. We ask whether a shift to instrument independence affects central bank behavior when monetary policy is already operating under the constrained discretion of an inflation targeting goal. Taking advantage of the unique UK experience to identify such an exogenous break, we estimate Taylor rules via alternative methods, specifications and proxies. We find that the institutional move to greater autonomy of the Bank of England, having augmented its responsibility, accountability and transparency in achieving the delegated inflation target, has also increased its sensitivity to, and the freedom to counter, inflationary pressures arising – with anchored inflation – via the output gap.

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1. The Recent UK Monetary Policy Framework as a 'Controlled Experiment'

An issue of cardinal importance in economic policy research, debates and reforms that has not yet been sufficiently studied is how institutions influence policy and economic outcomes. This paper constitutes an effort to improve our understanding in this general direction, by focusing on a particular type of institutional change that arises only rarely in economic contexts, in the sense of resembling a 'controlled experiment'. Our objective here is to address the question whether a shift to *instrument independence* affects central bank behavior when monetary policy is already operating in an inflation targeting regime, implying *goal dependence*.¹ Such has been the recent experience with monetary policy making in the United Kingdom (UK). We examine it empirically, in terms of policy reaction functions recovered from the data.²

UK monetary authorities moved to flexible inflation-forecast targeting in October 1992, and in May 1997 the Bank of England (BoE) was formally granted operational independence from Her Majesty's (HM) Treasury. In essence, the latter shift allowed the newly inaugurated Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank to set interest rates (each month), earlier the task of the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Treasury. Before this institutional change the BoE was one of the least independent major central banks in the world.³ Being granted instrument independence, it did not receive goal independence, though, to use the terminology introduced by Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994). The responsibility for setting the primary goal of monetary policy, in terms of a numerical inflation target (every year), was kept with HM Treasury. This nuance is important, insofar even now the BoE has no autonomy as large as that of the European Central Bank (ECB) or the Federal Reserve System (Fed): it still has to act under the 'constrained discretion', in the words of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) – or 'flexible rule', according to Woodford (2003) – imposed by the inflation targeting framework. Yet the Bank's augmented degree of operational freedom was also accompanied by a corresponding increase of its responsibility, accountability and transparency in achieving the delegated inflation target, as, for instance, Lasaosa (2005) has emphasized.⁴

Because of the explicit public announcement of the timing of these changes, to inflation targeting and to operational independence, both could be interpreted as exogenous. We see in that a rare opportunity to explore econometrically the effects of central bank instrument independence on policy responses

¹Inflation targeting – or, more precisely, inflation-forecast targeting – is the monetary strategy that appears to have become dominant in the modern theory and practice of central banking; see, for instance, Piger and Thornton, eds. (2004) or Bernanke and Woodford, eds. (2005).

 $^{^{2}}$ An approach evaluating the outcomes of central bankers' intentions ('words') and actions ('deeds') that prevails in current applied work; see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) and the subsequent literature.

 $^{^{3}}$ This has been admitted, among others, notably by Eijffinger and Schaling (1995) in a pre-independence publication of the Bank itself.

⁴See also Briault, Haldane and King (1997), for an earlier account on the relationship between BoE's independence and accountability, and Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002), for an international comparison along the lines of accountability and transparency.

shaped out under the goal dependence of an established inflation targeting strategy. This is an interesting theoretical and policy-informing issue that has not been addressed directly through an applied perspective.⁵ Essentially, the import of the present paper is in performing a careful and robust empirical analysis of the issue in the title across alternative choices of data, methods and specifications, and in proposing a unifying interpretation of the key results. The corresponding theoretical perspective is better explored, notably in recent research within the 'legislative approach to monetary policy', as labeled by Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), broadly involving optimal contracts, mechanism design or principal-agent interactions. In particular, Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) were the first to argue that instrument independence coupled with goal dependence was the socially optimal institutional arrangement to formulate and implement monetary policy in a democratic society. Such a monetary regime was specified by Svensson (1997) and Herrendorf (1998) as an inflation targeting framework, whereby the government delegates the reference interest rate setting to the central bank (or a monetary policy committee) but retains the quantification of the numerical inflation goal for itself. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002) further emphasized that a democratic approach to monetary policy of this type required augmented responsibility of the central bank for its actions as well as accountability to the government and/or the parliament. They also pointed to several dimensions within accountability, one of which is the transparency of actual policy making. Transparency has the potential to solve the private information problem identified by Canzoneri (1985) when central bank discretion was found optimal.

There are huge applied as well as analytical literatures on both central bank independence and inflation targeting, when considered in isolation. Instead, the present econometric investigation contributes to that line of research by being among the first to look at the intersection of these topics. We mostly build on the Taylor rule methodology in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Nelson (2003) but also on other relevant studies on the UK. We detect empirically two novel results: first, throughout the inflation targeting period the BoE has systematically responded to the output *gap*, and not at all to output *growth*; second, it has done so in a much stronger way *once* being granted instrument independence. These findings are consistent with New Keynesian theory of monetary policy, the Bank's mandate, and the evolution of the UK business cycle. Yet we stress in interpreting them that the institutional move to greater autonomy of the BoE has played a major role too, reflected in the estimated by several complementary techniques *quite higher* post-independence response to the output gap: receiving operational freedom has, in effect, augmented the Bank's responsibility, accountability and transparency in achieving the delegated inflation target and has ultimately increased the sensitivity of the Bank to inflationary pressures arising – with anchored inflation – via the output gap.

 $^{^{5}}$ A related article, Mihailov (2006), provides more detail on the developments in the British *institutional framework* for monetary policy making since the early 1990s and the current goals and instruments of the BoE. It then focuses on *realtime* data estimation of *forward*-looking Taylor rules via *GMM* to evaluate the stance and feedback of recent UK monetary policy. We here extend and go beyond this work in a few dimensions, as discussed further down.

The paper is further down structured as follows. The next section describes the data and some preliminary tests. Section 3 presents our alternative estimation methods and specifications of Taylor rules and discusses the econometric results we obtain, offering a unifying interpretation of our principal findings. The fourth section concludes.

2. Data and Preliminary Tests

All data were downloaded from the websites of the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the BoE. Our sample consists of quarterly observations, starting with the fourth quarter of 1992, when inflation targeting was introduced in the UK, and ending with the fourth quarter of 2004. The second quarter of 1997, when instrument independence was granted to the BoE, splits the sample into a preindependence and post-independence subsamples.

Following most other Taylor rule papers on the UK, in particular Nelson (2003) and Martin and Milas (2004), we assume that the short-term interest rate supposed to be the operating instrument of the BoE is best proxied by the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Inflation is measured by two alternative indexes that are usual choices when working with UK data: (i) the *Retail Price Index* (RPI), as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriveli, Osborn and Sensier (2004), among others; and (ii) the same Retail Price Index but eXcluding the mortgage rate (RPIX), as, for instance, in Nelson (2003).⁶ Our measure for the output gap is, alternatively, constructed out of two available time series: (i) the final or revised data for real GDP, as in the majority of studies on Taylor rules; and (ii) the real-time or initially released data for real GDP, available to policy makers 'in real time':⁷ more precisely, we use the real-time series constructed by Nelson and Nikolov (2001) and accessible on the BoE's website. Moreover, we have filtered each of these real GDP series in level by two now standard (although not perfect) procedures to obtain respective measures for the output gap, namely: (i) by fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Nelson (2003), among others; and (ii) by a Hodrick-Prescott detrending (with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600, as recommended for quarterly data), as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier (2004), among others. To arrive at results that are not necessarily sensitive to the detrending employed, we have preferred to work with both filters.

Descriptive statistics for the two periods of interest, *pre*-independence inflation targeting (1992:4-1997:1) in Figure 1 and *post*-independence inflation targeting (1997:3-2004:4) in Figure 2 are illustrated below.

[FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

 $^{^{6}}$ The RPIX has been the officially announced measure of UK inflation and guide for UK monetary policy in the period 1992-2003, and the RPI has performed that same role before 1992.

⁷Orphanides (2001, 2003) argued strongly in favor of real-time data, on the grounds that they are more realistic and, hence, that they usually fit better Taylor rule regressions.

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Nominal GDP data and the GDP deflator – hence, real GDP, by construction – were available at their source as seasonally adjusted (sa), whereas both price levels, the RPI and the RPIX, as well as the 3-month Treasury bill rate were not seasonally adjusted (nsa). We thus performed seasonality tests and found both price levels and the interest rate to display seasonal patterns. Consequently, two versions of our Taylor rule regressions were estimated: (i) with the *raw* data; and (ii) with *seasonally adjusted* RPI, RPIX and 3-month Treasury bill rate.

We ignored stationarity and cointegration issues and performed Taylor rule estimation in the way that is standard in recent New Keynesian monetary policy research. That is, we mostly relied on the econometric procedure employed by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) to handle the implied forwardlooking behavior. These authors defend the key assumptions in their work – stationarity of inflation and the nominal interest rate, as we shall also assume here – by stressing that they are both empirically and theoretically plausible. Moreover, the Neo-Wicksellian paradigm expounded in Woodford (2003), which constitutes the modern framework for monetary policy analysis,⁸ takes the above assumptions for granted, i.e., as initial axioms.

3. ESTIMATION METHODS, SPECIFICATIONS ESTIMATED AND KEY FINDINGS

Our overall empirical strategy was to apply the most common techniques used by now in similar Taylor rule studies. These techniques relate to ordinary least squares (OLS), in the earliest literature, and to two-stage least squares (TSLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM), in the more recent papers. Another objective we pursued was to begin from simpler specifications and move to more complicated Taylor rule versions and to econometrically better suited and justified techniques, thus basically following the chronology in which the literature evolved. We therefore started with a logical point of departure, by estimating the *original* Taylor rule with a few alternative proxies. Tests for structural breaks were then performed on it, essentially to check the validity of our split of the UK inflation targeting sample in the second quarter of 1997. Yet for theoretical and econometric reasons made clearer further down we give most weight to our findings when subsequently employing the GMM approach to estimating *forward-looking* Taylor rules popularized by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000).⁹

⁸Woodford (2003), chapter 1, traces the intellectual history of policy reaction functions back to the works of Wicksell (1898, 1907).

 $^{^{9}}$ Another recent estimation technique was implemented by Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002). They apply the structural time series (STS) approach proposed by Harvey (1989) to generate series of the expected inflation rate and output gap. By contrast, the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 2000) GMM approach consists in using the errors-in-variables method to model rational expectations: in it, instead of forecasting inflation and output – e.g., by Kalman filter methods, as in Muscatelli-Tirelli-Trecroci (2002) – future actual values replace as regressors expected values. Alternatively, inflation forecasts inferred from yield curves, e.g., as in Breedon and Chadha (1997) or Blake, Henry and Robertson (2002), or aggregated directly from surveys of expectations, e.g., as in Bakhshi and Yates (1998) or BoE quarterly bulletins, could have been used. Both these approaches, however, have many problems of their own, which is acknowledged in the cited papers, and are left for further research.

3.1. Ordinary Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules.

3.1.1. Point of Departure: The Original and Classic Taylor Rules. We estimated the Taylor (1993) rule on UK quarterly data for our two subsamples both in its original specification and in what we would call, following Woodford (2003), classic version. The original Taylor (1993) rule can be written as

(3.1)
$$i_t^T = i^T + b_{\pi,0} \left(\pi_t - \pi^T \right) + b_{x,0} x_t,$$

where i_t^T is the nominal interest rate (NIR) targeted by the monetary authority (i.e., the short-term policy instrument), $\pi_t - \pi^T$ is the so-called inflation gap (that is, the deviation of actual inflation, π_t , from a constant inflation target, π^T), $x_t \equiv y_t - y_t^P$ is the output gap (with y_t being actual output and y_t^P some measure of potential output). i^T is the desired constant NIR target when both gap measures are zero; more precisely, $i^T \equiv r^* + \pi^T$, where r^* is interpreted in a Neo-Wicksellian manner as the equilibrium 'natural' real interest rate. $b_{j,l}$ denotes the coefficient to the respective variable of interest $j = \pi, x, i$ (j = 0 stands for some compound intercept terms made explicit in the formulas that follow) at a respective lag(-)/lead(+) l = ..., -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, ... (l = 0 designates, of course, a current-period response). We can estimate (3.1), as specified with contemporaneous response parameters, directly from the data (for i_t^T , π_t and x_t) if we know the inflation target π^T . We did so with $\pi^T = 2.5$, as is most appropriate for our particular country case and sample period (see later). If we do *not* know the inflation target, (3.1) can be rewritten as

(3.2)
$$i_t^T = \underbrace{(i^T - b_{\pi,0}\pi^T)}_{\equiv b_{0,0} = const} + b_{\pi,0}\pi_t + b_{x,0}x_t$$

and estimated in the form of (3.2) as a *classic* Taylor rule.

Our results are presented in the first pair of columns in Table 1.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The original (or classic, if estimated transformed) Taylor rule performs quite impressively during our post-independence subsample. All variables are (i) statistically significant and have (ii) the expected (from theory) sign and (iii) magnitudes that seem quite reasonable. Furthermore, the coefficients $b_{\pi,0}$ and $b_{x,0}$ are found practically the same, 0.85, as Taylor (1993) argued (however, he quantified them both at 0.5 instead, without attempting econometric estimation). The only major problem with the regression results in Table 1 is serial correlation (reflected in the value of the Durbin-Watson statistics). Lagrange

multiplier Breusch-Godrfrey tests have established a likely positive autocorrelation of the residuals of the regression of order 1. When an AR(1) correction in the error process is introduced in the equation, with no any other modification, our results do not change qualitatively (although in quantitative terms policy responses become twice weaker), as can be seen in the second pair of columns in Table 1. In the *pre*-independence subsample another problem is that the output gap is statistically indistinguishable from zero, no matter which measure we use for it. However, when employing more complicated Taylor rule specifications and more sophisticated econometric techniques, as reported further down, we obtain results of a similar spirit. One interpretation may be in the sense that the BoE has not (systematically) considered the output gap in designing its monetary policy during 1992-1997 but has (consistently) reacted to it, as well as to inflation, during 1997-2004. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on inflation do not unambiguously indicate that the response to it by the BoE has increased or decreased in magnitude in the post-independence period relative to the pre-independence one. We return with more analysis and a plausible interpretation to these initial findings in the later parts of the present section.

3.1.2. Structural Break Tests. To check for structural breaks and, in essence, to see if our sample split could be confirmed econometrically, we performed Chow breakpoint and forecast tests on the classic Taylor rule (3.2). The dates we selected for the tests were potentially the most likely ones to have resulted in structural instability in UK monetary policy throughout the 1990s and until 2004. All these changes have been implemented following official public announcements, as discussed by Nelson (2003), among others, and can thus be considered as exogenous:

- Membership of the British sterling in the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Community, as from October 1990;
- (2) Sterling crisis and suspension of the ERM in the UK, in September 1992, followed by the installation of an *inflation targeting* framework for monetary policy as from October 1992;
- (3) Target inflation reformulated in June 1995 from a target band (or range) of 1% to 4% (implying a mid-point of 2.5% p.a.) to an explicit medium-term point target of 2.5% p.a.;
- (4) The BoE granted operational independence from HM Treasury in May 1997, and in June 1997 the 2.5% point target announced to become symmetrical: i.e., to give equal weight to circumstances in which inflation is higher or lower than the target rate;
- (5) In December 2003, target inflation *lowered* from 2.5% p.a. to 2% p.a., and *expressed* as from January 2004 in terms of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), instead of the RPIX.

The breakpoint and forecast Chow tests we performed have confirmed that the structural breaks delimiting our sample, (2) and (4) above, are the most supported by the data. We, therefore, continued to estimate over our two subsamples and to compare the results across them. 3.1.3. *Backward-Looking Taylor Rules.* One way to address the problems of endogeneity and, potentially, serial correlation usually encountered in classic Taylor rule equations while still applying the OLS method is to estimate them with all regressors *lagged* and by also adding an additional *lagged* dependent variable. Such backward-looking Taylor rules can be written in the form:

(3.3)
$$i_t^T = b_{0,-n} + \sum_{n=1}^N b_{\pi,-n} \pi_{t-n} + \sum_{n=1}^N b_{x,-n} x_{t-n} + \sum_{n=1}^N b_{i,-n} i_{t-n}^T,$$

with the dynamic structure truncated at some relevant lag length N. Most papers have found that lags of 1 or 2 are often sufficient to capture the dynamics of such equations. Another common finding, in addition to the problems of a theoretical nature in ignoring forward-looking rational expectations,¹⁰ has been that backward-looking Taylor rules are weak in terms of econometric output. This is what our results confirmed indeed.

3.2. Two-Stage Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. A second way to address the problems of endogeneity and, potentially, serial correlation in classic Taylor rule equations is to replace OLS by TSLS. Such is the main estimation strategy in Nelson (2003). It is also what we did next.

3.2.1. The Original and Classic Taylor Rules Again. Our TSLS results enhanced, as a matter of fact, those from the OLS estimation outlined above.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Table 2 indicates that there is no any important difference in our conclusions, even in a quantitative aspect, regarding the policy responses of interest. First, such equations for the UK perform amazingly well and can be sensibly interpreted in the *post*-independence period of inflation targeting. Second, they suggest that the output gap has not mattered *before* operational independence but has mattered afterwards – even *more* than inflation, if we judge by the magnitude of the respective coefficient estimates – in monetary policy decisions at the BoE.

3.2.2. Backward-Looking Taylor Rules Again. Our TSLS estimation confirmed further what the OLS method had found earlier concerning backward-looking Taylor rules. That is why we would conclude that the poor performance of such equations is most likely due not to the particular econometric technique implemented but rather to their problematic justifiability from the perspective of economic theory.

 $^{^{10}}$ On the other hand, a view has emerged that backward-looking rules contribute to protecting the economy from embarking on expectations-driven fluctuations. Yet Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) oppose this view in noting that a common characteristic of the existing studies that arrive at this conclusion is their focus on local analysis. Conducting global analysis instead, they find that backward-looking interest-rate feedback rules do not guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium.

3.3. Generalized Method of Moments: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules.

3.3.1. Forward-Looking Specifications: Theoretical Rationale and Econometric Estimation. As a third method to quantify BoE's feedback, in addition to OLS and TSLS, we finally turn to the popular Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) approach to estimating forward-looking Taylor rules. We do so because this recent methodology is appealing – and superior to both OLS and TSLS – in at least two respects, a theoretical one and an econometric one. By deriving from microfoundations monetary policy reaction functions within the set-up of the currently dominant and rather consensual paradigm of the New Keynesian macromodel, the approach provides a solid *theoretical* rationale for similar empirical work. The latter model, first derived by Yun (1996) and King and Wolman (1996), is also known – in a broader context – as the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model, after Goodfriend and King (1997). Such sticky-price analytical frameworks have by now been well explored, e.g., in Walsh (2003), later chapters, and in the Neo-Wicksellian treatise by Woodford (2003). For that reason, we would only present below the forward-looking feedback rules we estimated next. The second major appeal of the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) methodology is its *econometric* rationale. It follows from both the underlying economic model, NNS, and the corresponding estimation method, GMM. GMM essentially implies that some moment condition, or conditional expectation, should equal zero in equilibrium from theory (e.g., a consumption Euler equation or an orthogonality condition like the one we exploit later).

After log-linearization around a zero inflation steady state of the equilibrium conditions of the baseline NNS model and following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) in ignoring certain constant terms but using our notation, we first obtain¹¹ the implied ex ante *real* interest rate *target*:

(3.4)
$$r_{t,+k}^{T} = \underbrace{(i^{T} - \pi^{T})}_{\equiv r^{*} = const} + (\beta_{\pi,+k} - 1) \left(E \left[\pi_{t+k} \mid \mathcal{I}_{t} \right] - \pi^{T} \right) + \beta_{x,+q} E \left[x_{t+q} \mid \mathcal{I}_{t} \right].$$

Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) point to some insights embodied in (3.4); it clearly shows that (i) attaining the target 'on average' and assuming that the real interest rate is determined by nonmonetary factors in the long run implies a constraint on i^T which should be set equal to the exogenously given long-term 'equilibrium' real interest rate r^* plus the inflation target π^T (as noted earlier); (ii) interest rate rules characterized by $\beta_{\pi} > 1$ – an inequality known as the 'Taylor principle', after Taylor (1999) and Woodford (2001, 2003) – and $\beta_x > 0$ will tend to be stabilizing, to the extent that lower real interest rates boost economic activity (these properties have not, however, been without controversy in the literature¹²).

 $^{^{11}\}mathrm{Mihailov}$ (2006) provides more algebraic details in summarizing this common procedure.

 $^{^{12}}$ The Taylor principle has not always been found to hold empirically, see, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) for the UK or Mehra (2002) for the US. Theoretically, this principle is usually a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium, in the sense of unique stable solution assuming stationary disturbance

Incorporating further interest rate smoothing behavior, both evident in the practice of central banks and suggested by theory, and allowing for exogenous interest rate (i.e., here also monetary policy) shocks extends the framework to the commonly estimated equation for the *actual* (not *target*) nominal interest rate,

(3.5)
$$i_{t} = (1 - \beta_{i,-1}) \left\{ \underbrace{\left[r^{*} - (\beta_{\pi,+k} - 1)\pi^{T}\right]}_{\equiv \beta_{0,+k}} + \beta_{\pi,+k}\pi_{t+k} + \beta_{x,+q}x_{t+q} \right\} + \underbrace{\beta_{i}(L)}_{\equiv \beta_{i,-1}} i_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t},$$

where

(3.6)
$$\varepsilon_{t} \equiv -(1 - \beta_{i,-1}) \left\{ \beta_{\pi,+k} \left(\pi_{t+k} - E \left[\pi_{t+k} \mid \mathcal{I}_{t} \right] \right) + \beta_{x,+q} \left(x_{t+q} - E \left[x_{t+q} \mid \mathcal{I}_{t} \right] \right) \right\} + \nu_{t}$$

 ε_t in (3.6) is a linear combination of forecast errors and the exogenous disturbance to the interest rate, ν_t : it is, thus, orthogonal to any variable in the information set \mathcal{I}_t . Letting \mathbf{z}_t denote a vector of variables within the central bank's information set at the time when the decision on the interest rate is made, that is, $\mathbf{z}_t \in \mathcal{I}_t$, with elements of \mathbf{z}_t (and, therefore, instruments in the econometric sense) any lagged variables that help forecast inflation and output as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with ν_t , one can write $E[\varepsilon_t | \mathbf{z}_t] = 0$. (3.5) then implies the set of orthogonality conditions

(3.7)

$$E\left[\left\{i_{t} - (1 - \beta_{i,-1})\left(\underbrace{\left[r^{*} - (\beta_{\pi,+k} - 1)\pi^{T}\right]}_{\equiv \beta_{0,+k}} + \beta_{\pi,+k}\pi_{t+k} + \beta_{x,+q}x_{t+q}\right) - \beta_{i}(L)i_{t-1}\right\}\mathbf{z}_{t}\right] = 0,$$

which provide the basis for GMM estimation of the parameters of interest,¹³ collected in the vector $\boldsymbol{\beta} \equiv (\beta_{0,+k} \quad \beta_{\pi,+k} \quad \beta_{x,+q} \quad \beta_{i,-1})'$. To the extent that the dimension of vector \mathbf{z}_t is higher than the number of parameters to estimate, 4 in our case, (3.7) implies *over* identifying restrictions that can be tested in order to assess the validity of the specification estimated and of the set of instruments used.¹⁴ We present and discuss such test statistics further down.

processes, as Woodford (2001) has discussed, among others. More recent research, e.g., Davig and Leeper (2005) or Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghironi (2006), has modified or generalized the Taylor principle in various ways, depending on the underlying model structure.

¹³Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) note that, by construction, the first component of $\{\varepsilon_t\}$ follows an MA(a) process, with $a = \max\{k, q\} - 1$ and will thus be serially correlated unless k = q = 1. GMM estimation should then be carried out with a weighting matrix that is robust to autocorrelation (and heteroskedasticity), which we do.

 $^{^{14}\}mathrm{See,~e.g.,~Clarida,~Galı́}$ and Gertler (1998), pp. 1040-1041.

3.3.2. Summary of Estimates of Forward-Looking Taylor Rules. Equation (3.5) can be rewritten as

(3.8)
$$i_{t} = \underbrace{\left(1 - \beta_{i,-1}\right)\beta_{0,+k}}_{\equiv b_{0,+k}} + \underbrace{\left(1 - \beta_{i,-1}\right)\beta_{\pi,+k}}_{\equiv b_{\pi,+k}}\pi_{t+k} + \underbrace{\left(1 - \beta_{i,-1}\right)\beta_{x,+q}}_{\equiv b_{x,+q}}x_{t+q} + \underbrace{\beta_{i,-1}}_{\equiv b_{i,-1}}i_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t},$$

from where we obtained direct GMM estimates of what may be called – following, e.g., Surico (2004) – the 'reduced-form' parameters (the b's above). Then the corresponding 'structural-form' parameters (the β 's above) were recovered using the definitions in (3.8). Approximate standard errors for the policy responses of interest here, the β 's, were finally calculated by an application of the delta method. We estimated specifications where the *lead* for inflation varied from 1 to 8 quarters ahead, k = 1, ..., 8, and that for the output gap from 0 to 4, q = 0, ..., 4. The leads of k = 2, 3 for inflation and of q = 0, 1 for the output gap were most strongly supported by the data from the viewpoint of both econometrics and economics.¹⁵ Due to space limitations, we would focus on the results from our preferred, or 'benchmark', specifications reported in Table 3.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Panels A and B in the table compare the policy response coefficients from an identical forward-looking Taylor rule estimated via GMM over the *pre-* and *post-*independence subsamples, respectively, using the RPI to calculate inflation and both final and real-time GDP gap data.¹⁶ As can be verified in the last row of each panel, the validity of our overidentifying restrictions and of the set of our instruments cannot be rejected for all equations, and the goodness of fit is also very high. Then, the parameters of interest are statistically significant at all conventional levels in all specifications. Moreover, the positive expected signs of the response to both inflation and the output gap and the bounds between 0 and 1 of the smoothing parameter are everywhere satisfied.

We next turn to the magnitudes of the reaction coefficients in our 'benchmark' forward-looking Taylor rules in Table 3. Discussing any other of the alternative specifications we experimented with will not modify the quantitative essence of our key conclusions. A major result that we find robust across our numerous forward-looking regressions is a *much stronger* response of the BoE to the output gap *after* it became more autonomous. Thus, Table 3 reports always (i) *statistically significant* and (ii) *positive*

 $^{^{15}}$ In the former case, the econometric characteristics of the regressions such as statistical significance of most relevant parameters, higher adjusted R-squared, lower standard error of regression (SER) and higher probability value of the Hansen J-test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions have mattered overall. In the latter case, the signs and magnitudes of the statistically significant monetary policy feedback coefficients to inflation and to the output gap and the value of the interest rate smoothing parameter that make most economic sense and allow reasonable interpretation have been the major criteria of judgement.

 $^{^{16}}$ We present our results with RPI inflation instead of RPIX inflation mainly because of the much higher variation of the former relative to the latter in both estimated subsamples, as can clearly be seen in figures 1 and 2, which suggests a likely higher precision of the slope estimates of BoE's reaction function when the RPI is used to measure inflation.

estimates for the coefficient to the contemporaneous output gap, $\beta_{x,0}$, which, most importantly, (iii) indicate a unanimous and considerable rise in its magnitude in the post-independence period. An exact quantification of this magnitude is, unfortunately, not possible, as numbers vary across specifications. Nevertheless, we would conclude that the increase in BoE's reaction to the output gap under operational independence is anyway quite high, for two empirically inferred reasons. First, no matter whether our final or real-time data GMM estimates from forward-looking Taylor rules are taken into account, the increase of the output gap coefficient is substantial indeed (see, e.g., Table 3); as a matter of fact, it is likely to be of the order of 2 to 3 times, if we also consider the most frequently observed significant values across our forward-looking specifications with alternative proxies (not reported here, to save space). Second, another indication for a large increase in the response of the Bank to the output gap after it was granted operational independence was captured by the classic Taylor rules we estimated via OLS and TSLS earlier, as noted, with this response only becoming statistically significant in the post-independence subsample. Our econometric results, supportive of quite a big change in BoE's reaction to the output gap, lead us to believe that the institutional shift to greater central bank autonomy has also played a role. We return with more interpretation to these points below.

By contrast, we cannot say much as to whether the response to inflation or the degree of interest rate smoothing, reflected in our alternative estimates for the coefficients $\beta_{\pi,+2}$ and $\beta_{i,-1}$, have become stronger or weaker *post*-independence. Evidently, any conclusion in this sense would rest on a restrictive interpretation of a subset of our Taylor rule specifications and proxies, which we would not wish to force onto the data.¹⁷ For instance, *final* data indicate an increase in the response to inflation as well as in the degree of interest rate smoothing, irrespective of the particular output detrending used; whereas *real-time* data reverse this conclusion (see again Table 3). It might also well be that, with respect to both inflation and interest rate smoothing, the post-independence behavior of the Bank has not changed much, for one reason or another, to be definitely detected by our data.

This leads us to the question: Why should a central bank in an inflation targeting regime increase its reaction to the output gap *after* receiving instrument independence, with its reaction to inflation at the same time most likely not much changed (or, if increased, not at a comparable degree)?

Mihailov (2006) argued that this is exactly what the BoE – whose priority is to keep inflation low, the more so under *flexible* inflation targeting – should have done once the evolving UK business cycle is taken into consideration. The easiest way to understand this is to look at the dominant phase of the business cycle before and after operational independence. Comparing the respective descriptive statistics in figures 1 and 2, one can see that the output gap was characterized by a considerably negative mean (and by much more volatility) according to *all* our four gap measures during the pre-independence subsample

¹⁷Likewise, our results are inconclusive on the empirical validity of the Taylor principle by subsample.

and by a slightly positive mean (plus lower variability) during the post-independence one. It is, then, clear that the BoE has reacted in a much stronger way to the output gap when aggregate demand has, on average, been closer to potential supply, thus creating inflationary pressures, i.e., mostly during the post-independence period when inflation was, moreover, credibly anchored at the Bank's target.

However, the magnitude of the increase in BoE's response to the output gap appears econometrically quite too large, as we already claimed, to be due only to the evolving UK business cycle. One contribution of the present paper is, therefore, to complement and make more realistic the above explanation by adding a second, institutional factor: namely, the move in May 1997 to central bank instrument independence, but retaining goal dependence, in the UK monetary policy framework. The Bank's augmented autonomy has, in fact, implied a corresponding increase of its responsibility, accountability and transparency in achieving the delegated inflation target. Lasaosa (2005), among others, illustrates compactly our main point here by stressing that: (i) the *Minutes* of the MPC monthly meetings (introduced with operational independence in mid-1997 and containing the individual votes of the nine MPC members, four of which external) are published two weeks after each meeting; (ii) the average number of pages of the BoE's quarterly Inflation Report (introduced with inflation targeting in late 1992) has increased since 1997 from around 45 to 65, including a new section entitled "Monetary Policy since Latest MPC"; and (iii) the Governor has to write an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on behalf of the MPC if inflation deviates more than one percentage point from the inflation target. All these three institutional arrangements (and some other of a lesser importance, of course) accompanying the increased autonomy of the BoE definitely enhance the accountability as well as the transparency of UK monetary policy, hence the Bank's/MPC's responsibility when deciding on short-term interest rates every month, conditional on the available economic data and forecasts. BoE's much stronger reaction to the output gap postindependence is, therefore, not that surprising. It must be a logical consequence (i) in part, of the evolving UK business cycle, as claimed in Mihailov (2006), (ii) in part, of the institutional shift in the UK framework for monetary policy making, as we emphasize in the present paper, and (iii) in part, of the anchored inflation that characterizes the UK inflation targeting data (figures 1 and 2). Without instrument independence for the central bank, it is very likely that the government, wishing to support economic activity, would have exerted influence to alleviate or prevent such a strong monetary policy feedback to the output gap, itself intended as a forward-looking, preemptive response to rising inflationary pressures. Given our short sample, containing roughly one full cycle of contraction and recovery of the British economy within the inflation targeting period on which we focus here, we are not in a position to separate out the individual contribution of each of the above three principal factors largely explaining the estimated change in BoE's reaction function. Future research could, of course, address this issue.

Real GDP Growth Instead of Real GDP Gap? We next subject our key result and its interpretation offered thus far to what may be called a theory-consistency empirical test for monetary policy under inflation targeting. Mostly because of the well-known problems in measuring in 'real time' the *true* output gap, which cannot be observed, the use of the rate of real GDP growth (or some combination of it and other variables) instead of the real GDP gap has sometimes been proposed as desirable, for pragmatic reasons, when estimating central bank policy reaction functions.¹⁸ But while responding to an output gap measure is theoretically justified in a flexible inflation targeting regime like the one in the UK, reacting to real output growth is not: neither from the viewpoint of conventional (Barro-Gordon, 1983) and modern (Woodford, 2003) theory, nor because of BoE's delegated inflation target. So, has the Bank also reacted to real GDP growth, in a way similar to its asymmetric response to the output gap across the business cycle? To check whether BoE's behavior has been theory- and goal-consistent – not erratic – under instrument independence, we proceeded to estimation of the same Taylor rule specifications but with real GDP growth replacing real GDP gap.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Table 4, featuring our benchmark specifications but now with real GDP growth (in % p.a.) as explanatory variable, presents evidence that what the BoE has really cared about throughout the *entire* inflation targeting period is the output gap, and not the rate of growth of real output: nowhere in this table, before as well as after operational independence, is the coefficient on real GDP growth statistically significant at all. According to our forward-looking Taylor rule GMM regressions, the UK inflation targeting data thus clearly reject the idea that real GDP growth has guided BoE's monetary policy instead of the output gap.

There is good economic rationale, conventional as well as modern, behind such a finding, which could be summarized in the following way. There is no need for a central bank to (aggressively) react to any change in the rate of *growth* of real GDP *per se*; for example, real expenditure may grow in a depressed economy and there is no reason to overhastily abort such a (stabilizing) tendency. It is only with respect to a benchmark *potential* output (although controversial to estimate) that the increase in aggregate demand should matter for inflation expectations, and hence for an inflation-targeting central bank. But once aggregate expenditure comes close to the estimated capacity of an economy to produce output and threatens to surpass it, thus creating inflationary pressure and affecting unfavorably the (rational) expectations of economic agents about future inflation, the central bank should respond (aggressively), the more so under a *flexible* inflation targeting framework. Such an interpretation constitutes another important aspect in trying to logically explain the empirical findings in the present paper. It confirms

¹⁸See, in particular, Orphanides et al. (2000), McCallum (2001), Orphanides (2003), and Carare and Tchaidze (2005).

that the BoE has reacted in a justified and consistent way to the changing business cycle conditions in the period of its operational independence relative to the pre-independence inflation targeting period, as also envisaged by its broader mandate and in agreement with its increased responsibility and accountability.

4. Concluding Comments

This paper posed and investigated empirically a novel question: does a shift to central bank *instrument independence* matter for the conduct of monetary policy that already operates under the 'constrained discretion' of an established *inflation targeting* regime, implying *goal dependence*? We took advantage of the unique experience in that sense of the United Kingdom. Our econometric strategy concentrated on estimating forward-looking Taylor rules using the GMM approach, theoretically consistent with the New Keynesian monetary policy model popularized in similar contexts by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000). Yet we also applied OLS and TSLS to classic and backward-looking Taylor rules, for the purpose of comparability with earlier work as well as across alternative econometric techniques.

As is widely acknowledged, the move to instrument independence of the BoE has augmented the responsibility, transparency, accountability and the *marge de manoeuvre* of monetary policy in achieving the delegated inflation target. This institutional shift has, in our opinion, also increased the Bank's sensitivity to inflationary pressures, as captured by the much higher policy reaction coefficients to the output gap we estimated during post-independence. We also presented evidence that the BoE has systematically responded to the output gap, and not at all to output growth, which is consistent with both mainstream theory and the flexible inflation targeting mandate of the Bank.

Overall, the monetary strategy adopted in the UK in October 1992 and enhanced by the granting of operational independence to the BoE in May 1997 seems to have been successful in simultaneously avoiding three major policy problems known from the literature (and reflected in real-world experiences): the inflationary bias of full discretion, with or without political pressure (e.g., many high-inflation developing countries in a floating exchange rate regime), the lack of democratic accountability under complete central bank independence (e.g., some critiques on the ECB), and the time inconsistency of rigid rules (e.g., the currency board failure in Argentina). Our paper therefore brings partial evidence in favor of the hypothesis proposed by Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) that monetary policy under *instrument independence* with *goal dependence* would generally tend to produce low average inflation; as well as in favor of the now wide-spread claims of theoretical and empirical studies – in the spirit of the early work of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Svensson (1997) and Herrendorf (1998) – that inflation targeting may well be close to optimal monetary policy and best central bank practice (given the current economic circumstances in the world).

PANEL A.	Pre-Independen	ce Subsample: 1992	·4 – 1997·1 (18 ob	servations)
	-	-	``	,
Real GDP Filter:	•	Hodrick-Prescott	v	Hodrick-Prescott
i^T	$5.77^{***}(0.15)$	$5.76^{***}(0.09)$	$6.03^{***}(0.23)$	$5.78^{***}(0.13)$
$b_{0,0}$	$3.88^{***}(0.49)$	$3.68^{*}(0.41)$	$5.00^{***}(0.68)$	$4.58^{***}(0.66)$
$b_{\pi,0}$	$0.75^{***}(0.16)$	$0.83^{***}(0.15)$	$0.41^{*}(0.21)$	$0.48^{*}(0.42)$
$b_{x,0}$	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.27 (0.23)	0.20 (0.33)
AR1 term			$0.44^{***}(0.15)$	$0.42^{***}(0.21)$
$Adj R^2$	0.63	0.66	0.75	0.72
SER	0.35	0.34	0.29	0.31
DW	0.90	1.07	AR1 correction	AR1 correction
F p-v	0.000224	0.000118	0.000046	0.000101
PANEL B: I	Post-Independen	ce Subsample: 1997	7:3 - 2004:4 (30 ol	oservations)
Real GDP Filter:	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott
i^T	$4.95^{***}(0.14)$	$5.01^{***}(0.17)$	$4.56^{***}(0.75)$	$4.18^{***}(1.22)$
$b_{0,0}$	$2.81^{***}(0.45)$	$3.38^{***}(0.56)$	$3.55^{***}(0.81)$	$3.22^{**}(1.27)$
$b_{\pi,0}$	$0.86^{***}(0.17)$	$0.65^{***}(0.21)$	$0.40^{***}(0.14)$	$0.38^{***}(0.14)$
$b_{x,0}$	$0.85^{***}(0.16)$	$0.38^{**}(0.43)$	0.37 (0.24)	0.37 (0.23)
AR1 term			$0.90^{***}(0.08)$	$0.93^{***}(0.06)$
$Adj R^2$	0.61	0.39	0.92	0.91
SER	0.75	0.94	0.35	0.35
DW	0.39	0.22	AR1 correction	AR1 correction
F p-v	0.000001	0.000520	0.000000	0.000000

TABLE 1. Classic Taylor Rules: OLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap

EXPLANATORY NOTE TO TABLE 1: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of estimation is OLS; the estimated equations are (3.1) and (3.2), with intercepts i^T and $b_{0,0}$, respectively, and all other parameters the same, as explained in the main text; standard errors for the directly estimated coefficients $(i^T \text{ and the } b$'s) are in parentheses; ***, **, * = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; AR1 = correction for an autoregressive process in the error of the regression of order 1; Adj R² = adjusted R²; SER = standard error of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing first-order serial correlation in the error process when there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent variable in the regression specification); F p-v = F-statistic probability value (for the joint significance of all estimated parameters).

PANEL A:	Pre-Independence	ce Subsample: 1992	:4 - 1997:1 (18 ob)	oservations)
Real GDP Filter:	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott
i^T	$5.74^{***}(0.16)$	$5.75^{***}(0.09)$	$6.20^{***}(0.38)$	$5.78^{***}(0.13)$
$b_{0,0}$	$3.76^{***}(0.53)$	$3.51^{***}(0.44)$	$5.62^{***}(1.13)$	$4.42^{**}(1.58)$
$b_{\pi,0}$	$0.79^{***}(0.17)$	$0.89^{***}(0.16)$	0.23 (0.32)	0.54 (0.61)
$b_{x,0}$	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.11)	0.48 (0.45)	0.13 (0.75)
AR1 term			$0.52^{**}(0.19)$	0.39 (0.48)
$Adj R^2$	0.63	0.66	0.73	0.72
SER	0.35	0.34	0.30	0.31
DW	0.94	1.16	AR1 correction	AR1 correction
F p-v	0.000228	0.000106	0.000067	0.000108
PANEL B: I	Post-Independen	ce Subsample: 1997	7:1 - 2004:4 (30 of	oservations)
Real GDP Filter:	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott
i^T	$4.94^{***}(0.14)$	$5.00^{***}(0.18)$	$4.66^{***}(0.62)$	$4.23^{***}(1.15)$
$b_{0,0}$	$2.77^{***}(0.45)$	$3.43^{***}(0.57)$	$3.63^{***}(0.70)$	$3.40^{***}(1.22)$
$b_{\pi,0}$	$0.87^{***}(0.17)$	$0.63^{***}(0.22)$	$0.41^{***}(0.15)$	$0.33^{**}(0.15)$
$b_{x,0}$	$0.89^{***}(0.17)$	$1.24^{***}(0.42)$	0.56 (0.33)	$0.65^{*}(0.32)$
AR1 term			$0.88^{***}(0.10)$	$0.92^{***}(0.07)$
$Adj R^2$	0.61	0.38	0.91	0.91
SER	0.75	0.96	0.36	0.36
DW	0.40	0.24	AR1 correction	AR1 correction
F p-v	0.000001	0.000402	0.000000	0.000000

TABLE 2. Classic Taylor Rules: TSLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap

EXPLANATORY NOTE TO TABLE 2: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of estimation is TSLS; the estimated equations are (3.1) and (3.2), with intercepts i^T and $b_{0,0}$, respectively, and all other parameters the same, as explained in the main text; standard errors for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses; ***, **, * = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; AR1 = correction for an autoregressive process in the error of the regression of order 1; Adj R² = adjusted R²; SER = standard error of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing first-order serial correlation in the error process when there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent variable in the regression specification); F p-v = F-statistic probability value (for the joint significance of all estimated parameters).

-Independence	o California 1009.	4 1007.1 (10 a	
F	e Subsample: 1992:	4 – 1997:1 (18 C	bservations)
	/ /		me /Initial/
•		•	Hodrick-Prescott
$.53^{***}(0.13)$	$2.02^{***}(0.21)$	()	$1.29^{***}(0.18)$
0.52 (0.31)	4.48 (0.47)		3.13 (0.43)
$0.38^{***}(0.03)$	$0.21^{***}(0.04)$	$0.45^{***}(0.04)$	$0.37^{***}(0.05)$
0.88 (0.08)	0.47 (0.09)	1.09 (0.09)	0.91 (0.11)
$0.11^{***}(0.04)$	$0.21^{***}(0.03)$	$0.07^{***}(0.02)$	$0.12^{***}(0.02)$
0.60 (0.08)	0.48 (0.07)	0.47 (0.05)	0.29 (0.06)
$0.56^{***}(0.01)$	$0.55^{***}(0.02)$	$0.59^{***}(0.01)$	$0.59^{***}(0.01)$
.75	0.76	0.83	0.71
.29	0.28	0.31	0.31
.302956	0.288247	0.282935	0.289121
.79	0.82	0.82	0.82
PANEL B:]	Post-Independence	Subsample:	
997:3 - 2004:4	(28 observations)	1997:3 - 2001:	4 (18 observations)
Final	/Revised/	Real-Ti	me /Initial/
Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott	Quadratic	Hodrick-Prescott
11 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.15)	$2.82^{***}(0.22)$	$2.14^{***}(0.20)$
43 (0.44)	-0.38 (0.76)	4.62 (0.37)	3.72 (0.34)
$46^{***}(0.02)$	$0.38^{***}(0.03)$	$0.30^{***}(0.03)$	$0.42^{***}(0.04)$
79 (0.08)	1.96 (0.14)	0.48 (0.05)	0.73 (0.06)
$21^{***}(0.04)$	$0.17^{***}(0.05)$	$0.92^{***}(0.10)$	$1.06^{***}(0.13)$
71 (0.16)	0.88 (0.25)	1.38(0.16)	1.85 (0.23)
74*** (0.02)	0.81*** (0.02)	$0.39^{***}(0.03)$	$0.42^{***}(0.03)$
92	0.92	0.94	0.92
35	0.35	0.24	0.29
217969	0.224985	0.159138	0.264661
73	0.71	0.97	0.85
	Quadratic 53^{***} (0.13) 52 (0.31) 38^{***} (0.03) 88 (0.08) 11^{***} (0.04) 60 (0.08) 56^{***} (0.01) 75 29 302956 79 PANEL B: $97:3 - 2004:4$ Final Quadratic 11 (0.11) 43 (0.44) 46^{***} (0.02) 79 (0.08) 21^{***} (0.04) 71 (0.16) 74^{***} (0.02) 92 35 217969 73	$\begin{array}{c ccccc} 53^{***} & (0.13) & 2.02^{***} & (0.21) \\ 52 & (0.31) & 4.48 & (0.47) \\ 38^{***} & (0.03) & 0.21^{***} & (0.04) \\ 88 & (0.08) & 0.47 & (0.09) \\ 11^{***} & (0.04) & 0.21^{***} & (0.03) \\ 60 & (0.08) & 0.48 & (0.07) \\ 56^{***} & (0.01) & 0.55^{***} & (0.02) \\ 75 & 0.76 \\ 29 & 0.28 \\ 302956 & 0.288247 \\ 79 & 0.82 \\ \hline PANEL B: Post-Independence S \\ 97:3 - 2004:4 & (28 \ observations) \\ \hline Final /Revised/ \\ 2uadratic & Hodrick-Prescott \\ 11 & (0.11) & -0.07 & (0.15) \\ 43 & (0.44) & -0.38 & (0.76) \\ 46^{***} & (0.02) & 0.38^{***} & (0.03) \\ 79 & (0.08) & 1.96 & (0.14) \\ 21^{***} & (0.04) & 0.17^{***} & (0.05) \\ 71 & (0.16) & 0.88 & (0.25) \\ 74^{***} & (0.02) & 0.32^{***} & (0.02) \\ 92 & 0.92 \\ 35 & 0.35 \\ 217969 & 0.224985 \\ 73 & 0.71 \\ \hline \end{array}$	QuadraticHodrick-PrescottQuadratic $.53^{***}(0.13)$ $2.02^{***}(0.21)$ $1.13^{***}(0.16)$ $.52$ (0.31) 4.48 (0.47) 2.73 $.52$ (0.31) 4.48 (0.47) 2.73 $.38^{***}(0.03)$ $0.21^{***}(0.04)$ $0.45^{***}(0.04)$ $.38^{***}(0.03)$ $0.21^{***}(0.09)$ 1.09 (0.09) $.11^{***}(0.04)$ $0.21^{***}(0.03)$ $0.07^{***}(0.02)$ $.60$ (0.08) 0.48 (0.07) 0.47 $.60$ (0.08) 0.48 (0.07) 0.47 $.60$ (0.08) 0.48 (0.07) $0.59^{***}(0.01)$ $.75$ 0.76 0.83 0.29 $.29$ 0.28 0.31 $.302956$ 0.288247 0.282935 $.79$ 0.82 0.82 PANEL B: Post-Independence Subsample: $97:3 - 2004:4$ $(28 \text{ observations})$ $1997:3 - 2001:$ Final /Revised/Real-TiQuadraticHodrick-PrescottQuadratic 11 (0.11) -0.07 (0.15) 2.82^{**} (0.02) 0.38^{**} (0.03) 0.30^{***} (0.03) 1.96 (0.14) 0.48 (0.05) 21^{***} (0.04) 0.17^{***} (0.02) 0.39^{***} (0.14) 0.48 (0.25) 1.38 (0.16) 79 0.82 0.92 0.94 35 0.35 0.24 21^{***} (0.02) 0.81^{***} (0.03) 0.9

TABLE 3. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI and Real GDP Gap

EXPLANATORY NOTE TO TABLE 3: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is computed using the RPI; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (3.8), with k = 2 and q = 0; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form) coefficients (the *b*'s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ***, **, * = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coefficients (the β 's) are computed via the delta method; Adj R² = adjusted R²; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in our case here (we have $3 \times 4 + 1 = 13$ instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so there are 13-4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically $\chi^2(m)$ with degrees of freedom *m* equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.

PANEL A: Pre-In	dependence Subsample: 199	92:4 - 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data:	/ /	Real-Time /Initial/
$b_{0,+2}$	$0.81^{***}(0.14)$	$1.13^{***}(0.29)$
$\beta_{0,+2}$	1.95 (0.33)	2.53 (0.65)
$b_{\pi,+2}$	0.57*** (0.04)	$0.49^{***}(0.05)$
$\beta_{\pi,+2}$	1.36 (0.09)	1.11 (0.12)
$b_{y,0}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
$\beta_{y,0}$	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
$b_{i,-1}$	0.58*** (0.01)	$0.56^{***}(0.03)$
$\operatorname{Adj} \mathrm{R}^2$	0.68	0.67
SER	0.33	0.33
J-stat	0.283959	0.290898
OvId p-v	0.82	0.81
PANEL B: Post-Ir	ndependence Subsample: 19	97:1 - 2004:4 (28 observations)
PANEL B: Post-In Real GDP Data:		97:1 – 2004:4 (28 observations) Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Data:		, , ,
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$	Final /Revised/	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$	Final /Revised/ -0.08 (0.08)	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$	Final /Revised/ -0.08 (0.08) -0.64 (0.61)	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $\beta_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{\mu,0}$	Final /Revised/ -0.08 (0.08) -0.64 (0.61) 0.30*** (0.04)	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $\beta_{\pi,+2}$ $\beta_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{\mu,0}$	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04) 1.00 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.13)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{y,0}$ $\beta_{y,0}$ $b_{i,-1}$	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04) 1.00 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{y,0}$ $\beta_{y,0}$ $b_{i,-1}$ Adj R ²	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04) 1.00 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.13)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{y,0}$ $\beta_{y,0}$ $b_{i,-1}$	Final /Revised/ -0.08 (0.08) -0.64 (0.61) 0.30*** (0.04) 2.27 (0.29) 0.01 (0.04) 0.08 (0.37) 0.87*** (0.01)	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04) 1.00 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.13) 0.44*** (0.05)
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $\beta_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{y,0}$ $\beta_{y,0}$ $b_{i,-1}$ Adj R ²	$\begin{array}{r c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04) 1.00 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.13) 0.44*** (0.05) 0.88
Real GDP Data: $b_{0,+2}$ $\beta_{0,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{\pi,+2}$ $b_{y,0}$ $\beta_{y,0}$ $b_{i,-1}$ Adj R ² SER	$\begin{array}{r c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Real-Time /Initial/ 1.61*** (0.25) 2.88 (0.45) 0.56*** (0.04) 1.00 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.13) 0.44*** (0.05) 0.88 0.36

TABLE 4. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI and Real GDP Growth

EXPLANATORY NOTE TO TABLE 4: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inflation is computed using the RPI; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in the estimated equation, (3.8), with k = 2 and q = 0; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form) coefficients (the *b*'s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ***, **, * = statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coefficients (the β 's) are computed via the delta method; Adj R² = adjusted R²; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in our case here (we have $3 \times 4 + 1 = 13$ instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so there are 13-4 = 9 overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically $\chi^2(m)$ with degrees of freedom *m* equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of the above-summarized Hansen test for m = 9 overidentifying restrictions.




FIGURE 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Data: Pre-Independence Boxplot (1992:4-1997:1, 18 observations)

DATA SOURCE: ONS.




FIGURE 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Data: Post-Independence Boxplot (1997:3-2004:4, 30 observations or 1997:3-2001:4, 18 observations for the real-time data output gap measures)

DATA SOURCE: ONS.

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