Bart Streumer

Below are some of my papers, most as PDF files. Comments are very welcome. To go back to my home page, click here.

In draft

  • Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Presented at the 2011 Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop (under the title 'Are Normative Judgements Non-Cognitive Attitudes?'). 

    Many philosophers think that normative judgements are non-cognitive attitudes or attitudes that do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are unlikely to be right. Normative judgements, I argue, are more likely to be attitudes that do aim to represent the world.

  • Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. For David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Dancy.

    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.

Forthcoming

  • Can We Believe the Error Theory? Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy.

    According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that have been made to this theory.

Published

  • Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 325-348 (published online by Springer here).

    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then show that if we combine this conclusion with the conclusion of a different argument that Jackson has given to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties, it follows that there are no normative properties at all.

  • Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer. Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 79-86 (published online by Springer here).

    Ulrike Heuer claims that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. I argue that Heuer's examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what 'efficient steps' are, Heuer's claim is consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim.

  • Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

    This short chapter surveys the three main views about the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning, and ends by suggesting that these views instead describe different kinds of practical reasoning.

  • Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 537-561 (published online by Routledge here).

    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties.

  • Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 1-29 (published online by Blackwell here).

    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. I try to answer the question what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help to resolve some disagreements in which the difference between inferential and non-inferential reasoning plays a role.

  • Reasons and Entailment. Erkenntnis 66 (2007): 353-374 (published online by Springer here).

    What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose a different answer. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face, and that it does not face any other problems either. I end by showing what the relation between deductive logic, reasons for belief and reasoning is if this answer is correct.

  • Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (2007): 351-384 (published online by Springer here).

    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action, but most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it.

  • Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown. Utilitas 17 (2005): 226-30 (published online by CUP here).

    This paper is a rejoinder to Campbell Brown's reply to 'Can Consequentialism Cover Everything?'. I argue that, though Brown is right that my argument against semi-global consequentialism relies on the principle of agglomeration, semi-global consequentialists cannot rescue their view simply by rejecting this principle.

  • Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality (with Brad Hooker). In Alfred Mele and Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2004.

    This chapter surveys the debate between philosophers who claim that all practical rationality is procedural and philosophers who claim that some practical rationality is substantive.

  • Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'? European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 219-28 (published online by Blackwell here).

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.

  • Can Consequentialism Cover Everything? Utilitas 15 (2003): 237-47 (published online by CUP here).

    Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false, since consequentialism can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.

Reviews